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Current U.S. tax law creates a variety of incentives affecting municipal 
financial policy. Under current law, municipalities can borrow at a tax- 
exempt interest rate yet can earn the full market rate of return on any 
assets held. Residents, in contrast, if they borrow or lend as individuals, 
pay or earn the market rate of return but after personal income taxes. 
These differences in rates of return create a variety of arbitrage op- 
portunities, allowing communities and residents to borrow at low rates 
and invest at higher rates. 
The purpose of  this paper  is to examine empirically the financial 
policy of municipalities in four states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachu- 
setts, and Rhode Island) to see to what  degree these municipalities 
attempt to take advantage of  each  of  the available opportunities to 
engage in tax arbitrage. Our data come from the 1980 U.S. Census of 
Population and Housing, and the 1977 U.S. Census of  Governments. 
We  find clear evidence that communities do actively engage in  such 
tax arbitrage. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 3.1 we explore 
in more detail the tax incentives affecting municipal financial policy, 
and then discuss other factors that may also influence financial deci- 
sions, In section 3.2 we describe the construction of the data set used 
in  the  empirical study, and present  tables  summarizing the general 
characteristics of municipal financial policy. In section 3.3 we present 
and discuss the results of our regression analyses investigating the role 
of the various factors affecting municipal financial policy. Finally, in 
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section 3.4 we comment briefly on the implications of our results for 
the distributional and efficiency effects of the current tax treatment of 
municipal financial policy. 
3.1  Factors Affecting Municipal Financial Decisions 
3.  I.  1  Tax Factors 
Base Case 
Based on a simplified view of the current tax law, individuals, when 
investing as  individuals, face a nominal before-tax interest rate of r and 
an after-tax rate of r( 1 -  t),’  where t is their marginal personal income 
tax rate. Assume that all residents in a community face the same mar- 
ginal tax rate, that their marginal tax rate will remain  constant over 
time, and that any prospective home buyer in the community will have 
the same tax rate. (Assume also that if  they currently itemize deduc- 
tions, then they and any buyers will also itemize in the future.) 
If  an individual’s  community buys  securities, the community  can 
earn a before- and after-tax return of r, while the community can borrow 
at a tax-exempt interest rate, which we denote by r,.  By construction 
let r,  = r (1 -  2,).  Because of its tax-exempt status, r, has historically 
been approximately 70% of the value of r.2 
(1)  the community’s borrowing rate, r,, 
(2) the community’s lending rate, r, and 
(3) the residents’ borrowing and lending rate, r(  1 - t), 
create a variety  of arbitrage  opportunities whereby the community/ 
residents  can borrow at a low  rate and lend at a higher  rate. Three 
different forms of arbitrage are possible given the three different pair- 
wise differences in the borrowing and lending rates above. 
In the first and simplest form of arbitrage comparing rates of return 
(1) and (2),  the community can borrow a dollar through the municipal 
bond market and invest it in  taxable securities, receiving on net r - 
r,  = t,r.  The IRS has been concerned with this form of arbitrage, and 
in  1969 a  section  was added to the Internal  Revenue Code that at- 
tempted to restrict severely the extent of such arbitrage. Specifically, 
section  103(c) of  the Internal Revenue Code states that interest on 
municipal  debt is taxable  if  a  major portion  of a debt issue is  used 
directly or indirectly to buy securities earning a materially higher rate 
of return. Proceeds from a debt issue can be invested temporarily in 
taxable securities, however, and by statute up to 15% can remain in- 
vested for extended periods, as a reserve or replacement fund. The 
IRS has not been very aggressive in enforcing this statute. Only in 1979 
did it rule that a community which  has large holdings  of taxable  se- 
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curities relative to its outstanding debt is in violation of section 103(c) 
per se, even if the debt was issued for a clearly different purpose. The 
interpretation  of  the statute was less clear in  1977, the year our data 
were collected. In addition, the IRS has recently allowed communities 
to borrow in order to invest in  taxable securities if  the purpose is to 
raise their bond rating. We will assume for now, however, that the IRS 
does enforce the statute, so communities are permitted to invest only 
n percent of  any debt issue in taxable securities, and that all commu- 
nities puruse this arbitrage to the legal limit. Evidence on the extent 
to which communities engage in this arbitrage is presented below. 
A second form of arbitrage available to communities,  comparing rates 
of return (2) and (3), is to raise property taxes now, invest the proceeds 
in taxable bonds, then use the proceeds from the bonds to lower prop- 
erty taxes in the future. By investing indirectly through the community, 
individuals earn a rate or return on their investment of r, rather than 
the rate of return of  r(  1 -  t)  available when they invest directly. When 
they invest an extra dollar through the community, residents gain r - 
r(  1 - t) = rt each year in arbitrage  profit^.^ The IRS has not attempted 
to restrict this second form of arbitrage. 
In the third and final form of  arbitrage, comparing rates of return (I) 
and  (31,  communities/residents  attempt to take advantage of  the dif- 
ference between r,  and r(  1 - t).  Wealthier individuals, for whom r (1 
- t) <r,,,,  will  want  to borrow as individuals  and buy  tax-exempt 
securities. In this situation, their municipality plays no role. Individuals 
in lower tax brackets, however, for whom r(l -  t)>r,,  cannot borrow 
as individuals at the tax-exempt  rate in order to invest at r(1 - t)- 
only municipalities  can borrow at the tax-exempt  rate. But these in- 
dividuals can have their municipality borrow for them at rate r,,  then 
use what is borrowed to lower property taxes. The residents can then 
invest what they  save in property taxes and earn a rate of  return of 
r(l - t).  On net they gain r(l -  ti  -rm in arbitrage  profit^.^ However, 
communities are allowed by statute to invest a fraction of what they 
borrow in taxable securities. Given this, the net gain to residents each 
year per dollar borrowed becomes 
(I)  (I - n)(r(l - t) -r,)  +n (r - r,)  = rt,  -  (I - n)t). 
For many communities, the last two forms of arbitrage (raising prop- 
erty taxes and investing in bonds earning r, or lowering property taxes 
and borrowing at rate r,)  can simultaneously be worthwhile. However, 
if  both are pursued, the community is in effect borrowing at r,,, and 
investing at r, the policy that is restricted by the IRS. Each community 
must therefore choose to pursue either one policy or the other. Which 
is preferable? That depends first on the relative gain per dollar change 
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versus the other can be pursued and what offsetting costs are incurred 
in doing so. 
If the community chooses to lower taxes and borrow, what limits 
the amount of such tax arbitrage that it can undertake? One potential 
limit is that states set statutory limits on how much municipalities can 
borrow.  Generally, the statutes specify that the outstanding debt in a 
municipality cannot exceed some percentage of the assessed property 
value of the comm~nity.~  Commonly, separate limits are set for school 
bonds and for debt of special districts, so that creating special districts 
allows more debt to be issued.  In addition,  some forms of debt are 
normally entirely exempt from these limits, and states often provide a 
mechanism  to relax  binding  restriction  on debt issues. It therefore 
seems unlikely that a community would face such a binding limit. 
Similarly, states often allow debt to be issued for only certain pur- 
poses, e.g., capital expenditures and short-run cash flow needs. These 
restrictions  set some upper limit on debt issues, though communities 
should have some flexibility  in broadening the definition of  “capital 
expenditures” when the restriction  is binding.  Aggregate data, how- 
ever, suggest that this constraint is not close to binding on average. 
For example, Peterson (1978) and Peterson (1981) report the percentage 
of state and local capital expenditures financed by long-term bonds, 
by federal aid, and by other local resources for selected years between 
1952 and 1977. In these figures, long-term debt issues never exceeded 
56%  of total capital outlays, and never exceeded 65.4% of nonfederal 
expenditures on capital outlays. (The average figures were 42.7% and 
55.8% respectively.) Unfortunately, it was not possible to test explicitly 
whether such a constraint was close to binding in any of the towns in 
our sample.6 
Some other nonstatutory factor seems to limit the extent to which 
communities  issue debt. One possible factor limiting the amount of 
borrowing by a community is risk aversion on the part of residents. 
The real value of the outstanding municipal debt is random, depending 
on interest rate fluctuations and inflation.  Since the relative interest 
rates on municipal bonds and taxable bonds change substantially over 
time, as shown in Poterba (chapter 2 of the present volume), borrowing 
in the municipal market and investing in the taxable market is by no 
means a fully hedged investment. Risk aversion would limit the size 
of municipal debt relative to the individual’s total wealth, everything 
else being equal. 
Alternatively, the same set of factors appealed  to in discussion of 
corporate financial p~licy,~  agency costs and bankruptcy costs, could 
also play  a role in limiting the amount of municipal  debt. The only 
implicit  security that lenders have is the tax base of the community, 
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grows relative to this tax base.E In summary, agency costs and risk 
aversion each provide an explanation why municipal debt cannot be- 
come too large relative to the municipal property tax base, or the total 
wealth, of the community. 
Related factors presumably limit the extent to which residents will 
invest their wealth through the community. Accounting standards in 
communities would  normally be viewed  as lax compared with those 
of mutual funds, so residents may well fear that municipal employees 
could  divert  surplus funds  into excess expenditures on  municipal 
services, or invest it poorly. The more money that is invested in the 
community, presumably the more difficult it would be to guard against 
such behavior.  In addition,  the  risk  individuals  face with  such in- 
vestments includes not only the risk in the return on the securities, 
but also the  risk  in  the value  of their property relative  to the total 
tax  base  of  the  community,  and  the  risk  that  any buyer  may  not 
adequately take into account the value of the asset being purchased 
with  the house. Individuals  would  become increasingly  risk  averse 
at the margin as more of their wealth depended on the value of their 
house. 
The benefits from pursuing one or the other arbitrage strategy vary 
with the tax rate of the residents: the gain from investing through the 
community, rt, grows with t,  whereas the gain from borrowing through 
the community, r(t, -  (1 -  njt), falls with t. In contrast, the offsetting 
costs limiting the extent of such arbitrage should not depend directly 
on the tax rate of the residents. We would therefore expect communities 
with  low  tax rates to favor issuing  municipal  bonds, while  wealthy 
communities would prefer to invest through their community. These 
are two of the principal relationships we will look for in the empirical 
analysis. 
Complica  ring Factors 
In the above discussion, we assumed that the after-tax rate of return 
to savings for the individual was r( 1 -  tj, and ignored the individual’s 
portfolio problem.  However, if  individuals can exchange taxable and 
tax-exempt bonds freely and without constraint, they will do so until 
they  are indifferent  at the margin  to owning  one or the other. For 
example, at this point the cost of bearing the extra risk in the return 
on municipal bonds just offsets any gain in expected return. In this 
situation, they would, as residents, be indifferent to either having the 
community borrow in  the municipal bond market or to raising taxes 
(assuming n  = 0). Wealthier individuals (those facing a t > t,,,) will 
normally be in just this situation, investing in  taxable and tax-exempt 
securities  until  they  become ir~different.~  They would  then  find  the 
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implying  that  the gain  from having  the community  borrow  an extra 
dollar, as expressed in equation (I),  simplifies to nrt. Poorer individ- 
uals, in contrast, cannot sell municipal bonds short as individuals and 
invest  the proceeds in  taxable bonds, given existing institutions.  In- 
stead, they have their community borrow for them on the municipal 
market, just as  described previously. In summary, the gain to residents 
from an extra dollar of municipal debt would now equal max(t,  - (1 
- n)t,  nt)r. 
The above discussion also focused  on a situation where residents 
do not itemize. If residents do itemize, then any property tax payment 
costs residents  only (1 - t) percent  of the tax payment. Therefore, 
everything  else being  equal, lenders can  hope to collect  1/(1  - t) 
times  as much from residents  when residents  itemize, and so would 
view  1/(1 - I) dollars  of  debt from  a  community  where  residents 
itemize as equivalent in risk to one dollar of debt from a community 
of nonitemizers. As a result, both the costs of issuing an extra dollar 
of  debt and the  benefits  of  issuing an extra dollar  (see note 3)  are 
reduced  by  (I - t) percent  when  residents  itemize.  Communities 
where residents  itemize  should therefore undertake tax arbitrage  to 
the  same  extent  as communities  where  residents do not  itemize, 
everything  else being equal, but  in  doing so would  issue  1/(1 - r) 
times  as much debt. 
This argument assumes that if  residents  itemize deductions in one 
year,  then  they itemize in all  years. If  not, then individuals face an 
incentive to shift tax payments toward those years in which they item- 
ize, when  the payments are tax deductible.  Most new  homeowners 
itemize, but as time passes owners would eventually become increas- 
ingly unlikely to itemize. Therefore, new owners would face a strong 
incentive  to pay  as much  as possible  in  property taxes while  they 
itemize, and thus ought to avoid having their municipality borrow (and 
would prefer having it build up a reserve). Similarly, during the years 
in which the individual does itemize, he would prefer to push his prop- 
erty tax payments toward the years in which his personal income tax 
rate is highest. Furthermore, an individual who is no longer itemizing, 
and who is expecting to sell his house in the near future to someone 
who will be itemizing,  would much prefer to keep property taxes as 
low as possible now and have the municipality go into debt. The buyer 
can deduct the cost of repaying this debt, and will therefore reduce his 
bid for the property by only (1 - t)  percent of the value of the out- 
standing debt. The gain to the seller from lowering taxes is the full 
reduction in taxes, since he does not itemize, and losing (I -  r) percent 
of the gain through the sale price of his house is an atttractive exchange. 
By the same argument, an individual in this situation would be reluctant 
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3.1.2  Nontax Factors 
Lumpiness of  Capital Expenditures 
Conventional wisdom says that lumpy expenditures are more likely 
to be financed with debt, because it is difficult to adjust property tax 
rates enough to cover extraordinary capital expenditures. However, 
this factor does not necessarily imply high debt on average, as com- 
munities could built up assets in anticipation of heavy expenditures, 
and pay off any debt quite quickly. Most large expenditures, e.g., school 
buildings, are easily anticipated, making this process straightforward. 
Also, for large communities, any given lumpy capital expenditure would 
not be so large relative to the total budget, making it easier to pay for 
the expenditure over a short period of time. There seems to be little 
reason to expect in the data a strong association between the level of 
debt and the size of the community’s capital stock. 
Burden on Current vs. Future Residents 
Conventional wisdom also says that bond finance of capital projects 
and tax finance  of  current expenditures is  more equitable, because 
under this system payments and benefits coincide in time. If the housing 
stock is unchanging, however, any difference in the timing of payments 
and benefits ought to be capitalized in house prices, thus leaving in- 
centives on financial policy unaffected.  What current residents avoid 
paying now through use of debt they end up paying through reduced 
property values. This is true as long as buyers and sellers are in the 
same tax bracket, and buyers correctly perceive the fiscal position of 
the community. 
However, new buyers may well misperceive  the financial position 
of the community. For example, buyers are likely to take the property 
tax rate into account, but may  presume that taxes finance  constant 
real  expenditures, whereas debt service involves  constant  nominal 
expenditures (ignoring refinancing). This consideration leads to a pref- 
erence for tax finance. On the other hand, keeping the current tax 
rate low through debt finance may lead buyers to underestimate future 
tax bills. 
If  the housing stock is not fixed, then use of debt finance allows 
more of the cost of current expenditures to be pushed onto property 
used for new construction. When a house is built, that property be- 
comes a larger share of  the property tax base of the community, and 
so pays a larger share of the property taxes. When taxes are used to 
finance current expenditures, each property pays based on its current 
share of the total property tax base.  However, when debt finance is 
used, each property pays based on its share of the property tax base 
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during that time, then that property pays a larger share of the original 
expenditures if debt finance is used rather than tax finance. 
A community would not necessarily want to increase the tax burden 
on newly built houses, however. If this tax burden already exceeds the 
marginal cost of public services to new residents,’” and if the amount 
of new constrcution is sensitive to the property tax rate, then shifting 
taxes further onto new residents may not be desirable. 
Heterogeneity of the Community 
In the previous section, we made the obviously unrealistic assump- 
tion that the community was entirely homogeneous.  Modeling the po- 
litical decision making of a heterogeneous community is complicated, 
however. The median voter model is often used, and we will appeal to 
it below in the empirical work, but its characterization of the decision- 
making process is very nai’ve. The more heterogeneous the community, 
the less we would expect our tax story, as applied to the median income 
voter, to fit the data. Similarly, when relative prices of houses within 
the community are changing, there is a clear conflict of interest about 
financial policy, with uncertain outcome. 
Transactions Costs of Bond Zssues 
When municipal bonds are marketed, buyers seek information about 
the riskiness of the bonds. For large communities, rating services and 
brokerage houses will collect and provide such information. For smaller 
communities, however, the available information would be much less 
reliable. As a result, buyers would not be able to differentiate between 
safe and risky issues, and thus price them the same, encouraging risky 
issues and  discouraging  safe  ones,  the  classic  “lemons”  problem. 
Whether or not the market breaks down completely, we would expect 
our theory to be much less applicable to smaller communities. 
Rental Units 
Renters favor debt finance if there is rent control with a property tax 
pass through. If a project is financed by a property tax increase, then 
a tenant under rent control must pay the full cost immediately. How- 
ever, if debt finance is used, rental payments each year would go up 
only slightly.  If the tenant expects to move before the debt is fully 
repaid, then debt finance is clearly preferable. 
If  market rents are unconstrained, however, then the equilibrium 
rent is affected by municipal financial policy only through the prefer- 
ences of landlords-the  demand curve for apartments is unaffected by 
how expenditures are financed, but the supply curve would be affected. 
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community avoid debt and attempt to build up a reserve of taxable 
securities. Renter-voters may not perceive these incentives, however. 
3.2  Characteristics of  the Data Set 
In order to investigate the importance of the various factors affecting 
municipal financial policy, we have assembled what we believe to be 
a unique set of data. Our data source on government financial policy 
was the Finance Summary Statistics from the 1977 Census of Govern- 
ments. This tape provided information for all state and local govern- 
ment units on their revenues and expenditures, plus the book value of 
various categories of financial assets and liabilities that they held. Our 
data source on the characteristics of the residents of each community 
was the 1980 Census of Population and Housing,“ Summary Tape File 
3C. This tape reported  a variety of characteristics of the population 
and the housing stock for all  “minor civil divisions”  (MCDs) with a 
population  of  at  least  10,000 in  eleven  states, and all  counties and 
“places”  with a population of  at least  10,000. 
Unfortunately, the two data sets were not easily matched. To begin 
with, the identification codes for each observation on the two tapes 
had no relation. Fortunately, the Census kindly created for us a third 
tape that matched these identification codes wherever possible. In ad- 
dition, however, many “places”  are not contiguous with any unit of 
government, while many  units of  government (e.g., school districts) 
do not coincide with a “place” or an MCD, the unit of observation on 
the Census of  Population and Housing tape. By necessity, our study 
had  to be confined either to MCDs and those places that coincided 
with units of government, or to counties. Our judgment was that the 
population of each county would be very heterogeneous, and the vari- 
ation in average characteristics across counties would be too small to 
allow much to be learned from county data. Our study therefore focuses 
on data for MCDs and places. 
In many states, however, school districts and special districts are 
very important, and these districts can issue debt in  their own right. 
Residents should not care whether debt is issued by their municipality 
or by their special district-they  are liable either way-so  how much 
debt is issued by  MCDs versus special districts should be arbitrary. 
But matched data is available only for MCDs. 
In order to avoid the problem of  arbitrary division of  financial re- 
sponsibility, we focused on four states where only a small fraction of 
the short-term debt and full-faith-and-credit long-term debt was issued 
by  units of  government other than  MCDs: Connecticut (5%), Maine 
(32%), Massachusetts (20%), and Rhode Island  (1%).‘*  Within these 
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For each community, we constructed a measure of  its outstanding 
debt. This figure was defined to equal the book value at the end of the 
year of short-term debt plus long-term general obligation debt, minus 
any holdings of state and local bonds. We made no attempt to estimate 
the market  value  of  the outstanding debt, given the reported book 
values. Our presumption was that since all data came from the same 
calendar year, the ratio of market value to book value should be very 
similar for all communities.  l4 
We did not include in our measure of debt the book value of revenue 
bonds or other nonguaranteed  bonds that each community had out- 
standing. Such bonds are not legal liabilities of the municipal govern- 
ment, and are not paid for out of property tax revenues. 
We  next  constructed a measure for each community of  the book 
value at the end of the year of its holdings of Federal securities and 
other bonds, notes, mortgages,  and financial assets, excluding state 
and local government securities. A critical issue in constructing this 
measure was the proper treatment of cash and deposits held in “sinking 
funds, bond funds, or other noninsurance funds.” Such deposits could 
be held primarily for liquidity purposes soon after bonds are issued or 
soon before bonds are retired.  If they earn less than the interest due 
on the bonds, as would  checking  accounts and perhaps savings ac- 
counts, then there is no arbitrage reason to borrow to put the proceeds 
in cash and deposits. However, deposits might also be held in money- 
market funds or certificates of deposit, and earn a return well above 
that on municipal bonds. In order to compare the typical rate of return 
earned on cash and deposits with that earned on other taxable secu- 
rities, we regressed total interest income divided by the par value of 
all security holdings (IIS) against a constant and the fraction of total 
security holdings held in cash and deposits (CDIS).  The results were 
as follows (standard errors are in parentheses): 
(ZIS) = .045 + .015 (CDIS). 
(.011)  (-013) 
The estimated rate of return on cash and deposits is 6% per year, almost 
exactly the interest rate of 5.94% earned in one-year Treasury notes 
of  1977, and higher than the estimated 4.5%  earned on other taxable 
securities.”  In  most  of the results  reported below,  we  therefore in- 
cluded cash and deposits in our measure of taxable security holdings. 
We also ignored any assets held in the various insurance and pension 
funds. It is possible that communities choose to borrow to overfund 
their insurance and pension funds, contributing more now and less later 
and earning a market return tax free in the interim.16 Unfortunately, 
we had no information about the extent of overfunding in our data set, 
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From the Census of Population and Housing we attempted to con- 
struct a measure of the median marginal personal income tax rate of 
residents in each community. The tape reports the median family in- 
come in each community. We then assigned to each family income the 
average marginal personal income tax rate observed for that income 
level in the NBER TAXSIM file for 1980.18 
We  did  not  have any data on average wealth or average property 
values of  residents in each community, as an indicator of the tax ca- 
pacity of the community. As a proxy, we used the total income of all 
residents in the community. 
We  also had no information on the percentage of the residents in a 
community who itemized. According to  the theory, communities where 
the median voter itemizes will want to issue 1/(1 - r) times as much 
debt as  communities where the median voter does not itemize. In most 
of the results reported on below,  we made no attempt to control for 
differences across communities in the probability that the median voter 
itemizes. As we present the results, we will discuss what biases are 
likely to be present, given this omission. 
Tables  3.1-3.4  present various  summary characteristics of  the fi- 
nancial policy of communities in our sample. In each table, we have 
divided our communities into six marginal tax-rate categories, with the 
average  marginal  tax rates of the categories  ranging  from 23.4% to 
35.0%. Table 3.1 reports the average of the ratios within each category 
of the book value of outstanding municipal bonds divided by the total 
income of the community. It reports these figures for the entire sample, 
for large communities (population over 25,000), for small communities 
(population under 25,000), for relatively homogeneous  communities, 
and for relatively heterogeneous communities.  l9 Based on the tax ar- 
bitrage arguments of the previous section, we would expect the ratios 
to decline with the marginal tax rate and to decline more dramatically 
for large communities.  Both of these expectations are borne out un- 
Table 3.1 
Sample 
Municipal Debt as a Percentage of Municipal Income 
Range of  marginal income tax rates 
,210-  ,245-  .257-  ,275-  .293-  .325+ 
.245  ,257  .275  ,293  .325 
1.  All  7.9  7.3  6.9  6.7  6.3  4.0 
2.  Large towns  10.7  8.7  6.8  7.2  3.7  3.1 
3.  Small towns  5.2  6.1  7.0  6.4  6.8  4.3 
4.  Homogeneous  4.5  7.8  6.9  6.4  7.0  5.4 
towns 
towns 
5.  Heterogeneous  10.2  6.6  7.0  7.4  4.8  3.0 64  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
ambiguously in the data. Higher tax rate communities do still borrow, 
but much less so relative to their aggregate income than do lower tax 
rate communities.  In small communities, there is no clear pattern to 
the figures. The theory has no clear predictions about the differences 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous communities. Here we find 
that the ratios tend to decline in both cases. 
The observed degree to which debthncome is lower in  rich  com- 
munities should underestimate the responsiveness of debt policy to tax 
incentives, since the median voter would be likely to itemize only in 
the richer communities. In such richer communities,  we should observe 
1/(1  - t) times as much debt as they would choose to accept if they 
did not itemize. Had we been able to control for the effects of itemi- 
zation, the pattern observed in table 3.1 should have been much stronger. 
Table 3.2 reports similar figures for several other measures of the 
financial  position  of  these communities.  The first  and  second lines 
report the average ratio of debt to municipal tax revenues for the total 
sample and for large communities.  The theory suggested nothing di- 
rectly about these ratios, though they do show a similar but weaker 
pattern than the figures in table 3.1. The next four lines describe the 
average ratio of federal and other securities held, excluding or including 
cash and deposits, divided by the total income of the community. If 
communities all prefer to borrow through the municipality rather than 
invest  in  a tax-free  way,  then these figures  should all be a uniform 
fraction of the corresponding figures on the first two lines of table 3.1. 
Table 3.2  Alternative Measures of Financial Position 
Definition/Sample  Range of marginal income tax rates 
Debt/Revenues 
1.  All 
2.  Large towns 
Securities/Income 
without deposits 
3.  All 
4.  Large towns 
5.  All 




7.  All 





















,257-  .275- 
,275  .293 
73.5  74.1 
69.6  76.0 
0.87  0.45 
1.07  0.41 
2.8  1.9 
2.9  2.0 
49.1  40.7 
42.6  46.2 
.293-  .325+ 
,325 
69.8  48.3 
51.0  37.1 
0.28  0.35 
0.26  0.41 
2.3  2.0 
2.1  1.7 
54.2  64.7 
79.2  87.5 
NOTE:  All figures are reported as percentages rather than as fractions. 65  An Examination of  Municipal Financial Policy 
The average of the actual fractions, calculated using the cash-inclusive 
definition of federal securities, is reported on lines 7 and 8 for all and 
for large communities. For large communities, we do find that security 
holdings increase with marginal tax rate, as the theory forecasts. 
Table 3.3 is designed to provide information about the size of the tax 
savings achieved through tax arbitrage within each marginal tax-rate 
category. The simplest form of arbitrage is to borrow at the municipal 
rate  and  invest at the taxable  rate, gaining rt,  per  year  per  dollar 
borrowed. The first line reports the average of min(D,S)/Yas a measure 
of how much of this arbitrage is occurring, where D represents debt, 
S  represents security holdings, inclusive of  cash and deposits, and  Y 
represents total income of the community. The second form of arbitrage 
is to borrow and use the proceeds to lower taxes,  saving residents 
max(t,  - t,O)r per year.20  In the second line of the table we report the 
average value of  max(D - S,O)/Y, as a measure of  the extent of this 
second arbitrage. Finally, communities might also raise property taxes 
and invest in securities tax free, saving rt per dollar invested. The third 
line of  the  table  reports the average ratio of  max(S - D,O)/Y as a 
measure of this third form of arbitrage. By the theory, we would expect 
wealthier communities to favor this third form of arbitrage. 
In order to approximate the average tax savings from municipal fi- 
nancial arbitrage within each marginal tax rate category, we require 
data on r and t,.  For r, we used  .076, the average nominal rate on 
twenty-year government bonds in  1977.21  There was no compelling 
reason for choosing this rate rather than many alternatives,  and all 
figures would simply change proportionately if another rate were cho- 
sen. Choosing a value for t, is more important. If we simply compare 
the interest rates on municipal and taxable bonds in  1977, we find an 
implicit tax rate of 32% comparing twenty-year prime municipals with 
twenty-year new issue AA industrials, and 51%  comparing one-year 
Table 3.3  Extent of Various Forms of Tax  Arbitrage 
Definition  Range of  marginal income tax rates 
.210-  .245-  .257-  ,275-  ,293-  .325+ 
,245  .257  ,275  ,293  .325 
I.  min (D, S)/Y  2.7  2.3  2.3  1.8  2.2  1.7 
2.  max (D - S, 0)lY  5.2  5.1  4.6  4.9  4. I  2.3 
3.  rnax (S  ~  D, 0)lY  0.14  0.26  0.48  0.12  0.08  0.27 
Tax savingslY 
4.  t, = .225  0.049  0.044  0.049  0.033  0.039  0.036 
5.  t,  = .35  0.120  0.105  0.101  0.075  0.074  0.052 
NOTE:  The definition of securities includes cash and deposits. All figures are reported 
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prime municipals with one-year governments. But none of these com- 
parisons  controls for risk,  call  provisions, etc. Gordon and Malkiel 
(1981) report a comparison of interest rates on taxable bonds and tax- 
exempt industrial revenue bonds issued simultaneously in 1978 by the 
same firm with similar provisions. In this sample, t, is estimated to be 
only 22.5%. given this dispersion of estimates, we calculated the tax 
savings for each marginal tax category for both t,  =  .225 and t,  = 
.35.  These estimates equal: 
r/Y[max(t,  - t, 0) . rnax(l) -  S, 0) + I,,,  *  min(D,S) 
+ t . max(S - D,O)] 
The resulting figures for t,  =  .225 are reported on the fourth line 
and for t,  =  .35  on the fifth line. Tax benefits  are larger for poorer 
communities, particularly when t, = .35:  poor communities gain more 
from borrowing and do more of it than do rich communities, whereas 
rich communities do little to take advantage of the opportunity to invest 
tax free through their community. The reported figures represent the 
tax savings before taking account of  itemization. Those communities 
where residents itemize, predominantly the richer communities, save 
only (1 - t)  times the reported figures given that the payments would 
have been tax deductible, so that the reported figures understate the 
degree to which poor communities gain relative to rich communities. 
For all communities, however, the tax savings are extremely small. 
One question raised by the figures in the tables is whether commu- 
nities do in practice borrow and establish substantial  holdings of taxable 
securities, in spite of IRS rules attempting to limit it. In order to examine 
this, we calculated the distribution of SID, and report this distribution 
in table 3.4, defining S to be either exclusive or inclusive of cash and 
deposits. Here we find that with the exclusive definition of S, over 10% 
of the communities hold taxable securities  amounting  to more than 20% 
of the book value of their debt, and six communities have  invested 
more in taxable securities than they have borrowed. This evidence is 
not necessarily  inconsistent with  strict  IRS  enforcement of  section 
103(c)-these  outlier communities could recently have had large issues 
of bonds, the proceeds from which had not yet been spent. However, 
Table 3.4  Taxable Securities Held as a Percentage of Municipal Debt: 
Distribution across Communities 
Percentile Range 
Definition  0  0-.1  .l-.2  .2-.3  .3-.4  .4-.5  >.s 
Securities/Debt 
1.  Without deposits  60.9  23.6  4.1  ?.2  0.4  2.9  5.4 
2.  With deposits  0.4  8.3  22.8  18.5  11.2  8.3  30.4 67  An Examination of  Municipal Financial Policy 
using the cash-inclusive definition of securities, most communities have 
far more securities than the IRS rules would seem to allow. This phe- 
nomenon is not restricted to the four states we focus on. In all munic- 
ipalities in the United States, municipal security holdings were 37.5% 
of municipal debt. 
3.3  Analysis of  the Data 
In the previous section, we compared the financial policies of com- 
munities with residents having different marginal income tax rates. In 
doing so, however, we made no attempt to control for other factors 
that also might  affect  financial policy.  In this  section, we construct 
measures of a few other factors that ought to influence financial policy, 
and then regress various measures of municipal financial policy against 
these factors as well as the marginal tax rate of the residents of the 
community, to see to what degree the association  found above between 
a community’s marginal tax rate and its financial policy might be caused 
by other factors. 
In the discussion of tax incentives in section 3.1, we argued that if 
individuals itemize, if  they itemize in some years but not in others, if 
they face different tax rates in any of the years in which they itemize, 
or if  they intend to sell their house in the near future and the likely 
buyer faces a different tax rate or itemizes while the seller does not, 
then strong tax incentives exist to change municipal financial policy. 
No information is available  that directly measures the frequency of 
occurrence of any of these circumstances. Instead, we picked a variety 
of indicators from the Census of Population and Housing. 
The most direct indicator of the likelihood that the median voter of 
the community itemizes is the median income of residents. From the 
NBER TAXSIM file, we know the percentage of taxpayers who itemize 
(Po at each income  level.  If  communities  segregate  by  itemization 
status as well as  by income, then in this percentage of the communities 
of a given income level the median resident will itemize. If the median 
resident does itemize, then the community ought to be observed with 
1/(1 - t) times as much debt, everything else being equal, or equiva- 
lently be observed with the fraction t/(l - t)  more debt. Therefore, if 
communities do segregate by itemization status, then, everything else 
being equal, the expected debthncome ratio for a community would be 
changed  by  the factor (1  +  tPZ/(l  - t))  because of  the effects  of 
itemization. 
The simplest indicator of changing itemization  status over time is 
just the age distribution of the residents. Younger residents are more 
likely to itemize. Since they are less likely to be itemizing when they 
are older, they would wish to pay as much as they can in taxes while 68  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
they are young when property tax payments are tax deductible. Older 
residents are less likely to itemize and more likely  to expect to sell 
shortly. As a result, they may either want to borrow now, since a buyer 
will likely itemize to be able to deduct the payment, or avoid borrowing 
now, since the buyer might misperceive a high property tax as repre- 
senting a fixed real rather than a fixed nominal burden. The particular 
summary measures of the age distribution that we chose were: (1) the 
percentage  of  the  adult  (over age  twenty-five) population  that  was 
younger than age forty-five (% young) and (2)  the percentage of the 
adult population over age sixty (% old). 
The Census also contained several direct indicators of the past mo- 
bility  of residents currently living in the town. High mobility among 
owners indicates that residents are more likely to be itemizing, having 
recently acquired a mortgage, so they prefer to pay for expenditures 
now while the tax payments are tax deductible. It also indicates that 
an existing resident will more likely  sell his house in the near future, 
and prefer  more debt if  the  buyer is itemizing  and in  a higher  tax 
bracket. The particular indicators that we used were: (1) the percentage 
of housing units in which  the current occupant moved in within  the 
last five years (HMOVE), and (2)  the percentage of residents who lived 
in a different county five years earlier (CMOVE). 
In the first  section, we also argued that renters would  prefer debt 
finance if they are covered by rent control, but perhaps ought to prefer 
tax finance otherwise. The Census did report the percentage of housing 
units that were rented (% rent). Unfortunately, we knew nothing about 
whether rent control existed in any community. 
If  new housing units are being built in town, part of the burden of 
current expenditures can be pushed onto new housing units with debt 
finance, but not with tax finance. The particular measure of community 
growth we used was the percentage of existing housing units built within 
the last five years (HNEW). 
Since  state regulations can potentially  limit  (or at least  influence) 
how much debt municipalities within the state do issue, we included 
separate constant terms in the regression for each state. Based on the 
severity of the state regulations reported in note 5, we would expect 
municipalities in Connecticut to have the most debt, and those in Rhode 
Island to have the least. However, the direction of causation may not 
be clear-the  size of the state’s limits may well just reflect common 
practice among the state’s municipalities. 
Finally, in  some regressions reported below, we also included as a 
regressor the ratio of municipal expenditures to aggregate income (El y). 
Based on the arguments in the first section, there would be no reason 
to expect any causal relation between debt and expenditures. However, 
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subsidy to municipal expenditures, then it must be true that commu- 
nities that spend more are able as a result to borrow more. Finding an 
association between debt and expenditures in the data, after controlling 
for other factors, would at least suggest that spending more allows a 
community to borrow more, implying  that the ability  to issue  tax- 
exempt bonds provides some subsidy to municipal expenditures. (Since 
it is commonly argued that this tax exemption specifically subsidizes 
capital expenditures, it would have been preferable to try as an addi- 
tional variable the value of the municipal capital stock divided by in- 
come. No data were available on the municipal capital stock, however.) 
Our basic measures of  the financial position of a community were 
(1) total debt outstanding divided by total income, (DIY),  and (2) debt 
net of security holdings (measured inclusive of cash and deposits) di- 
vided by income (D - S)IX We  tried a variety of regression  specifi- 
cations, reported in tables 3.5-3.7,  in order to test the robustness of 
the association we found previously between a community’s financial 
policy and the marginal income tax rate of its median resident. In the 
first, we simply regressed each of our two measures of a community’s 
financial policy against the list of indicators described above (ignoring 
the itemization factor), and the marginal tax rate of the median resident 
of the community. Since the tax incentive to issue debt is proportional 
to max(t,  -  t,O), however, we expected that the effects of the marginal 
tax rate would be nonlinear, with variation in r mattering most when t 
< r,.  We therefore created two tax rate variables,  fL  = min(t,.27) and 
fH = max(t - .27,0), thereby allowing the marginal effect of changes 
in t to differ depending on whether t is less than or greater than 0.27.22 
Our expectation was that the effect of each tax-rate variable on mu- 
nicipal debt holdings would  be negative,  but that rH  would be much 
less important. 
These regression  results are reported in  tables  3.5 and 3.6, using 
either dependent variable,  and estimated over either all communities 
or  only large communities. In table 3.5, we omit (EIY),  while we include 
it in table 3.6. 
In every case, the coefficients of the marginal tax rate variables have 
the signs and patterns forecast from the theory: forecasted gross and 
net debt declines with marginal tax rate, and more quickly when the 
tax rate is low than when it is high. The results show no clear difference 
in the degree to which  communities  invest in securities.  If  all com- 
munities invested in securities  just up the allowed IRS limit, then the 
forecasted values of (D -  S)/Y  should be proportional to those for DI 
Y,  with a proportionality factor of about 0.80. The coefficients on the 
tax rate variables in table 3.5  do tend to be proportionately smaller, 
though only by about 12%, when (D -  S)/Y  is the dependent variable. 
However, the tax coefficients in table 3.6 tend to be larger when (D - 70  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
Table 3.5  Regression Results (Expenditures/Income Omitted) 
Independent  Dependent variablelsample 
v  a  r  i a  b  I e  Dl Y  (D - S)lY  DIY  (D - S)/Y 
1.  Constant 
2.  IL 
3.  I" 
4.  %young 
5.  % old 
6.  CMOVE 
7.  HMOVE 
8.  % rent 
9.  HNEW 
10.  Conn. 
11.  Maine 
12.  Mass. 
Standard error 
R2 
of  the regression 
All towns 
0.43  0.42 
(0.13)  (0.13) 
-  0.93  -  0.80 
(0.30)  (0.32) 
-0.26  -  0.23 
(0.14)  (0.15) 
-  0.04  -0.12 
(0.13)  (0.14) 
-0.28  -  0.35 
(0.13)  (0.14) 
-0.07  -  0.07 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
-0.11  -  0.05 
(0.10)  (0.11) 
0.09  0.06 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
0.02  0.00 
(0.10)  (0.10) 
0.02  0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
-0.02  -  0.02 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
-0.00  -0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
0.041  0.043 
0.205  0.145 
Large towns 
0.84  0.87 
(0.20)  (0.25) 
-2.32  -2.12 
(0.45)  (0.59) 
-0.53  -  0.45 
-  0.07  -0.21 
-0.42  -0.56 
(0.27)  (0.36) 
(0.23)  (0.31) 
(0.22)  (0.29) 
(0.08  )  (0.10) 
-  0.06  -  0.03 
(0.19)  (0.25) 
-0.02  -  0.02 
(0.08)  (0.11) 
-  0.04  -  0.05 
(0.20)  (0.26) 
0.04  0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
-  0.00  0.00 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
0.03  0.02 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
-  0.02  -0.01 
0.038  0.050 
0.422  0.241 
NOTE:  Standard errors are in parentheses under the coefficients. 
S)/Y  is the dependent variable, suggesting some tendency for wealthier 
communities to invest more in securities. 
The estimated magnitude of the effects of the tax rate is substantial, 
particularly in table 3.5. For example, ifwe forecast using the estimated 
coefficients how much more debt relative to income a large community 
will have if  its tax rate equals 0.35 rather than 0.234, the difference in 
tax rates between the highest and the lowest of the six groups examined 
previously, we forecast a difference in  DIY  of 0.126 using the coeffi- 
cients in  table  3.5 and 0.069 using  the coefficients in  table  3.6.  In 
comparison, when we estimated this difference previously in the second 
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Table 3.6  Regression Results (ExpendituresIIncumes Included) 
Independent  Dependent variablelsmple 
variable  Dl Y  (D - S)IY  DIY  (D- S)lY 
I.  Constant 
2.  I, 
3.  I,, 
4.  %young 
5.  9% old 
6.  CMOVE 
7.  HMOVE 
8.  9% rent 
9.  HNEW 
10.  Conn 
1 I.  Maine 
12.  Mass. 
13.  EIY 
Standard error 
R2 
of the regression 
All towns 
0.18  0.24 
(0.12)  (0.13) 
-0.35  -0.39 
(0.28)  (0.32) 
(0.13)  (0.  15) 
0.02  -  0.08 
(0.12)  (0.14) 
-0.15  -  0.25 
(0.12)  (0.14) 
-0.02  -  0.03 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
-0.17  -  0.09 
(0.09)  (0. I 1) 
0.08  0.06 
(0.04)  (0.05  ) 
0.12  0.08 
(0.09)  (0.10) 
0.02  0.01 
(0.09)  (0.01) 
-0.01  -0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
-0.02  -0.02 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
0.57  0.40 
(0.07)  (0.08) 
~  0.15  -0.15 
0.037  0.042 
0.357  0.570 
Large towns 
0.38  0.56 
(0.19)  (0.27) 
-  0.86  -1.16 
(0.47)  (0.69) 
~  0.47  -  0.41 
(0.24)  (0.35) 
-  0.05  0.20 
(0.20)  (0.30) 
-0.33  -  0.50 
(0.19)  (0.28) 
0.03  0.03 
(0.07)  (0.10) 
-0.17  -0.10 
(0.17)  (0.2.5) 
0.03  0.07 
(0.07)  (0.1  1) 
0.15  0.07 
(0.17)  (0.26) 
0.03  0.01 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
0.01  0.01 
(0.03)  (0.04) 
0.00  0.00 
(0.01)  (0.02) 
0.68  0.4.5 
(0.12)  (0.18) 
0.033  0.049 
0.219  0.290 
of  0.076. This implies that our previous  results did not arise from a 
failure to control for other observable factors. 
Comparing the results in tables 3.5 and 3.6, we find that including 
(EIY) makes a large difference. It does appear that communities are 
able to borrow more if they spend  even though the theory in 
section 3.1 suggested no clear reason why additional spending should 
cause the community to incur additional debt. (In fact, one might argue 
that additional spending would make the community a less attractive 
risk to a lender, since the extra spending would be a competing demand 
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If this observed association between spending and debt is interpreted 
as causal, then we conclude that spending is made cheaper because of 
a community’s ability to issue tax-exempt debt. How large a subsidy 
to spending is implied by these estimates‘? The difficulty in answering 
this question is that in the data we are comparing the stock of debt 
with an annual flow of expenditures. In order to interpret the results, 
let us assume that half of new debt issues are short term (one year), 
and half are long term (twenty years), and let us assume that all debt 
is repaid when it  Assume also that d% of  expenditures each 
year are financed by debt, and assume expenditures have been growing 
in nominal terms at g% each year. Between 1957 and  1977, nominal 
state and local expenditures grew at 9.6% per year, so let us approx- 
imate g by .096. Then at any point in time, the stock of debt outstanding 
would equal S(dE +  dEe-gsds) where E equals the current level of 
expenditures and  s  indexes  years. Our regression  coefficients  imply 
that large communities that spend a dollar more have as a result $0.68 
more debt outstanding, so that the total current debt arising from past 
expenditures should equal (0.68)E. Equating the two expressions and 
solving for d, assuming g = 0.096, we find that d = 0.1375; that is, 
each extra dollar of spending allows a community to issue 0.1375 dollars 
of extra debt. 
When a community issues a dollar of tax-exempt  debt for twenty 
years, the cost of making payments on the debt, assuming that t < t,, 
equals 7 Y,e  r(l  ~  r)sds +  ,-*Or(’  - ‘1.  If t  = 0.234 (the value for the 
poorest of our six groups), if  t,  = 0.35, and if  Y  = 0.076, then this 
expression equals 0.90: the tax-exempt status lowers the cost of  the 
long-term debt by  10%.  Similarly, when debt is issued for one year, 
given the same procedure and parameter values, the debt is cheaper 
by  0.86% (approximately  r(1  - t) - Y,)  because of  its tax-exempt 
status. Given our assumption that half of the debt issued is short term 
and half is long term, the average savings from issuing debt are 5.43% 
of the value of the debt issued. Since, by our calculations, a dollar of 
extra expenditures results in only 0.1375 dollars of extra debt, the cost 
of this dollar expenditure is reduced by only 0.0543 - 0.1375 = 0.0075 
dollars as a result of the tax-exempt status of the debt, a trivial 0.75% 
subsidy rate for this low-income community. For wealthy communities, 
for whom  t > t,,  there would  be no reduction in the cost of extra 
expenditures. Our results  therefore suggest that this tax exemption 
should have virtually no effect on the cost of municipal expenditures. 
20 
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Among the other coefficients reported  in  tables 3.5 and 3.6, most 
tend to be small and insignificant. In many cases, the forecasts from 
the theory were also ambiguous. The coefficients do indicate the fol- 
lowing: (1) Middle-aged communities tend to have the most debt, while 
younger communities have slightly less debt and older communities 
have much less debt. This pattern  seems to be more consistent with 
the life-cycle pattern of spending on local public services, some fraction 
of  which is debt financed, than with the tax  arbitrage arguments of 
section 3.1. (2) Mobile communities tend to avoid debt, as expected. 
(3) Connecticut communities tend to have slightly more debt, as ex- 
pected, though there are no clear differences among the other states. 
The results reported in tables 3.5 and 3.6 suffer from the problem 
that the dependent variable is deflated by income, and in addition three 
independent variables, EIY  and the two tax-rate variables, are con- 
structed using income information.  If  the reported income figures do 
not measure the correct theoretical concept without error, as is inev- 
itable, then the previous coefficient estimates are somewhat biased. 
We  felt that the indirect correlation with the residual would be great- 
est for (EIY),  so we reran the previous regressions with instrumental 
variables, using as instruments all the independent variables except for 
(EIY),  plus (Elpopulation), (Elpopulation)*,  and the fraction of the pop- 
ulation of  school age. The results were almost identical to those re- 
ported in tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
Any  bias  that  is  due to correlation of  the tax  variables with  the 
residuals should be slight-the  tax variables are constructed using me- 
dian family income, and the correlation of this with total income of the 
community should be small. To attempt to control for any bias, how- 
ever, instrumental variables did not seem worthwhile-there  seemed 
to be no good instruments for marginal tax  rates. Instead, we tried 
deflating the dependent variable by tax revenues rather than income. 
Tax revenues are probably less highly correlated than is income with 
property values, the deflator argued for in section 3.1, but the corre- 
lation should still be high. In addition, with this specification we test 
whether communities simply rely proportionately on debt finance vs. 
tax finance when funding expenditures. 
The resulting coefficient estimates are reported  in table  3.7.*’ We 
have omitted  (expenditureslrevenues) from these regressions,  as its 
variation reflects intergovernmental transfers as well as interest pay- 
ments on existing debt, factors that are either irrelevant or endogenous. 
Since the mean value of the dependent variable is approximately ten 
times as large as that of DlU, the coefficient estimates are also much 
larger. However, all previous patterns in the coefficients remain pres- 
ent, particularly for large communities. For example, the forecasted 
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Table 3.7  DebtlRevenue Regressions 
Independent  Dependent variablelsample 
variables  DIR  (D - S)IR  DIR  (D- S)IR 
1.  Constant 
2.  tL 
3.  t" 
4.  %young 
5.  %old 
6.  CMOVE 
7.  HMOVE 
8.  % rent 
9.  HNEW 
10.  Conn. 
11.  Maine 
12.  Mass 
Standard error 
R2 
of the regression 
All towns 
2.6  2.9 
(1.6)  (1.5) 
-  1.2  -  2.3 
(3.8)  (3.6) 
-  3.3  -  2.8 
(1.8)  (1.7) 
-  1.4  -  1.7 
(1.7)  (1.6) 
-3.1  -  3.5 
(1.7)  (I .6) 
-  0.4  -  0.4 
(0.5)  (0.5) 
-  0.9  -  0.5 
(1.3)  (1.2) 
1 .0  0.7 
(0.6)  (0.5) 
1.7  1.3 
(1.2)  (1.1) 
0.2  0.1 
(0.2)  (0.  I ) 
-  0.2  -0.1 
(0.2)  (0.2) 
-  0.2  -0.2 
(0.1)  (0.  I) 
0.512  0.78 
0.154  0.144 
Large towns 
4.5  5.9 
(1.7)  (2.5) 
(3.9)  (5.7) 
-  6.9  -6.3 
(2.3)  (3.4) 
-  1.0  -2.2 
(2.0)  (3.0) 
-  3.4  -4.7 
(1.9)  (2.8) 
0. I  0.5 
(0.7)  (1.0) 
-  0.6  -0.7 
(1.6)  (2.4) 
-  0.4  -0.4 
(0.7)  (1.1) 
0.4  -0.0 
(1.7)  (2.5) 
0.3  0.1 
(0.1)  (0.2) 
0.1  0.1 
(0.2)  (0.4) 
0.1  0.0 
(0.1)  (0.2) 
-8.1  -  10.5 
0.324  0.482 
0.276  0.120 
0.234 and t  = 0.350 is 0.307, forecasting using the coefficients of the 
full sample, and 0.844, using the sample of large towns. In comparison, 
the differences reported in table 3.2 for these two cases were 0.231 and 
0.272 respectively. While the statistical fit is somewhat poorer when 
DIR is the dependent variable, the qualitative results reported previ- 
ously continue to be present-our previous findings do not seem to 
arise from a simple statistical bias. 
Another bias caused by the multiple roles of income arises from the 
fact that residents  in  higher-income communities are more likely to 
itemize, and communities where residents itemize, by our theory, should 
have  111  - t)  times as much debt. Since primarily rich communities 75  An Examination of  Municipal Financial Policy 
itemize, had we controlled for the effects of itemization, the estimated 
effects of taxes should have been yet stronger. To  estimate how sen- 
sitive our results are to the effects of itemization, we reran the previous 
regressions for large communities after multiplying all right-hand-side 
variables, including the constant, by the factor (1 + tPZl(1 - t)).  As 
expected,  ,the coefficients on the tax variables were larger, though not 
dramatically so. The other coefficient estimates were similar to those 
reported previously. Since our proxy for whether a community itemizes 
is far from perfect, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
3.4  Conclusions 
On theoretical  grounds, we  argued  that poorer communities  face 
much stronger incentives to issue municipal bonds than do wealthier 
communities, and our empirical work showed that poor communities 
do  in fact borrow a great deal more. In contrast, wealthier communities 
should face an incentive  to invest  through  their community and so 
avoid tax on income from savings, yet we found in the data only limited 
evidence of such a pattern. Apparently, municipal employees are not 
trusted as investment managers. 
What then  do we conclude  about the distributional and efficiency 
effects of these tax incentives faced by municipalities? In section 3.2, 
we calculated  the tax savings to residents resulting from municipal 
financial policy, and found that the poorest communities gained the 
most relative to their income, though for all communities the tax sav- 
ings, as a percentage of income, were extremely small. Of course, the 
wealthy gain substantially as purchasers, rather than issuers, of mu- 
nicipal bonds, and this gain to the wealthy, as purchasers of tax-exempt 
bonds, should be the dominant distributional  effect of the provision 
making these bonds tax exempt. Those in the middle of the income 
distribution are left with little gain from either side of the market. 
Communities undertake only a limited amount of such tax arbitrage 
because there are some offsetting costs, owing perhaps to costs of risk 
bearing and agency and bankruptcy costs. These offsetting costs, which 
are real costs, are one component of the efficiency cost of the tax- 
exempt status of municipal bonds. At the margin, in equilibrium, these 
costs must be as large as any extra tax savings. In aggregate, these 
costs must  be smaller, though, otherwise no arbitrage  would  occur. 
How much smaller is not clear. For a detailed simulation study of the 
efficiency and distributional effects of the tax-exempt status of interest 
on municipal bonds, see Gordon and Slemrod (1983). 
One justification commonly given for the tax-exempt status of in- 
terest on municipal bonds is to subsidize municipal expenditures. Yet, 76  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
according  to our estimates, any reduction in  the cost of  municipal 
expenditures arising from the tax-exempt status of  municipal bonds is 
trivial. The  justification for tax-exempt bonds must be sought elsewhere. 
Notes 
We  would like to thank Harvey Brazer for extensive comments on an earlier draft, 
and William Shobe for very able assistance with the empirical work. The work on this 
paper was begun while Gordon was employed at AT&T Bell Laboratories, and completed 
while Slemrod was a national fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and not necessarily those 
of the NBER, AT&T Bell Laboratories, or the Hoover Institution. 
I. We  implicitly assume that individuals can borrow and lend freely at a before-tax 
interest rate of r, pay tax on any extra interest earnings (e.g.. do not save at the margin 
in an IRA), and itemize if  they borrow. If individuals face a higher opportunity cost of 
funds, owing, for example, to binding borrowing constraints, then the discussion in the 
text would need to be modified in a straightforward way. 
2.  See, for example, Poterba, chapter 2 of the present volume. 
3.  If the individual itemizes, then the accounting of cash flow is identical to that for 
an IRA. Given itemization, a property tax increase of  $(I/(  1 - t)) costs the individual 
$I net of income taxes. After a year, the community owns $(  1  + r)/(I -  r) in assets. 
When it lowers property taxes by this amount, the individual saves (I + r)  net of income 
taxes, given the deductibility of  property tax payments.  Since the dollar, if  invested 
directly, would have been worth (  1  + r(  1 - t)), the net gain to investing a dollar in the 
community equals (I + r) - (I + r(l - t)) = rt. 
4. These incentives have also been described in Adam  (1977) and Gordon and Slemrod 
(1983). If  residents itemize,  the  story would  be  modified  slightly,  as in  note  3. The 
community would  borrow $(l/(l - t)),  saving residents $1,  given the deductibility of 
property taxes, which they can then invest at an interest rate r(l  ~  t).  When the municipal 
debt is repaid, the individual must pay (1  + r,,,)/(I  - t)  extra in property taxes, but at 
a cost net of income taxes of  (I + r,,,). Arbitrage profits are still r(  I - t) -  r,,,,  but now 
on municipal  borrowing of $(l/(l - t)). 
5.  For example, in the states we examine below the limits are as follows. In Maine, 
each municipality may issue debt up to 7.5% of assessed value, school districts may 
borrow up to 12.5% of assessed value, and special districts and other government entities 
face their own debt ceilings. In Massachusetts, cities can borrow up to 2.5% of assessed 
value,  towns up to 5%, and  fire, water,  light, and  improvement districts up to 5%; 
however, the first two limits can be doubled with permission from the state. In Rhode 
Island, municipalities can borrow up to 3%  of assessed value, but excluded from this 
limit are housing authority, public building authority, and various other bonds; the state 
can authorize towns to exceed these limits. Connecticut, in  contrast, restricts general 
obligation debt to 2.25 times the latest tax receipts, though it makes certain types of 
debt exempt from these limits. The limits can also be increased for certain purposes, 
such as school building projects or urban renewal. For further discussion, see Starner 
(19611, or ACIR (1974). 
6.  The problem was that the reported figures for long-term debt issues in  1977 in our 
sample included a sizable amount of revenue bonds, used to finance such activities as 
utilities, pollution control, hospitals, single-family housing, industrial aid, etc. In aggre- 
gate in  1977, Peterson (1978) reports that total debt issues, including  revenue bonds, 
equaled 118.7% of local capital outlays, and the figures in our sample were not much 
different. Revenue bonds, however, are with  rare exception not  legal liabilities of the 
municipality, and are repaid out of  mortgage payments, rental income, or other user 
fees. The municipality, when issuing revenue bonds, is merely acting as a conduit for 77  An Examination of  Municipal Financial Policy 
funds for some other quasi-public or private organization, and not providing any tax 
arbitrage for residents. Unfortunately, we have no  figures on issues of general obligation 
debt. 
7.  For an overview of these various factors, see Gordon (1982). 
8.  As in the discussion of corporate financial policy, further debt issues would  raise 
the probability of default, leading to higher anticipated real expenditures by both lenders 
and the community when negotiating a settlement. 
9.  IRS rules do not allow interest on debt to be deducted if  the funds are borrowed 
to buy  tax-exempt securities. However. if  an individual borrows for another purpose, 
interest is deductible even if municipal bonds are simultaneously held. In most case, an 
individual should be able to avoid this IRS rule. If the IRS rule is binding, however, then 
the risk-adjusted value of  rm would  exceed rfl  - t),  and individuals in  this situation 
would prefer to avoid municipal borrowing. 
10. This could occur if the community has imposed tight zoning restrictions on new 
construction. 
1 I. While the dates of the two censuses were three years apart, we felt that this gap 
was small enough to ignore. 
12. With more time, we might have expanded the sample further to include New York 
(26%). New Hampshire (30%), and perhaps Wisconsin (40%). 
13. Three towns were eliminated for which the reported figures were estimated by the 
Census rather than reported by the town. 
14. Measurement error should be less, however, for growing communities, where debt 
would  have been issued more recently. 
15. This figure is the return on book value rather than market value, so its low value 
probably just reflects the fact that the bonds tend to be old. 
16. For a description of  these incentives, focusing on corporate plans, see Black (1980) 
and Tepper (1981). 
17. lnman and Seidman (1980), however, find that local government pensions tend to 
be underfunded. 
18. We  would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for calculating these figures for us. 
19. A community was defined to be homogeneous if  at least 24% of its families had 
an income within 20% of the median income. 
20.  Residents do presumably bear some offsetting costs, however, such as risk and 
agency costs.  Unless  state restrictions on borrowing are binding, in  equilibrium the 
marginal increase in these costs as more debt is issued would just equal the extra taxes 
saved. Average costs would be substantially less than average tax savings, however. 
21.  The interest rate data used in  this paragraph come from the Salomon Brothers 
Center, An Analytical Record of  Yields and Yield Spreads. 
22.  The break point of 0.27 was chosen because it provided a reasonable estimate of 
t,,  and because it divided the sample approximately in half. 
23.  Other explanations for the statistical association are possible, however. For ex- 
ample, communities with large amounts of commercial and industrial property can both 
spend more and find  it attractive to borrow more-lenders  would  have the commercial 
and industrial tax base as additional collateral. 
24.  The results are very insensitive to these assumptions about the maturity structure 
of the debt. 
25.  Asefa, Adams, and Starleaf (1981) report similar regression results. Specifically, 
on a sample of 660 large towns taken from the 1972 and 1967 Censuses, they regressed 
(change in the book  value of  nominal debt between  1967 and  1972Mestimated total 
expenditures) against median income, capital expenditures as a fraction of total expen- 
ditures, % old, HMOVE, percent growth rate in population, and a  few other variables. 
They also found a negative effect of median income, and in addition found that a dollar 
of extra capital expenditure was associated with $0.314 of extra debt issues. However, 
changes in debt, the focus of their work, need have only a very weak connection with 
the equilibrium level of debt holdings, the focus of our paper. Communities may mostly 
finance large capital expenditures initially with debt in order to avoid large fluctuations 
in  their property tax rates, but may differ substantially in how quickly they pay back 
the debt or the degree to  which they  build  up reserves in  anticipation of  upcoming 78  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
expenditures. Their coefficient estimates also ought to be unstable across time periods, 
since the dependent variable, changes in nominal debt, is strongly affected by the inflation 
rate and the age distribution of  the debt. 
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Comment  Peter Mieszkowski 
This paper on municipal financial policy is full of interesting ideas. It 
goes well beyond any paper I am familiar with in this area of research. 
The most thought-provoking result in that the reduction in the cost of 
municipal expenditures arising from the tax-exempt status of municipal 
bonds is  very  small, and  that the justification for tax-exempt  bonds 
must be sought elsewhere. 
To understand this result better I distinguish between two interrelated 
issues. First, the effect of the existence of tax-exempt  bonds on the 
choice between  debt and  taxes (equity) in  the finance  of  municipal 
expenditures; second, the effect of tax-exempt bonds on the level of 
expenditures by local governments. 
Following Gordon and Slemrod, I assume varying personal tax rates 
for the representative household in different communities. Also, I fol- 
low the authors and assume that the IRS severely limits the extent to 
which communities can engage in arbitrage by borrowing at the tax- 
exempt rate r,  and lending at the higher taxable  rate, r, by  holding 
taxable securities. 
In a high-income, high-tax community, where the representative tax- 
payer is a net lender, itemizes deductions, and invests in tax-exempts, 
the existence of tax-exempts has no effect  on the level of municipal 
expenditures for public consumption and on the choice between tax 
finance and bond finance. 
In this community, by assumption, residents, at the margin, borrow 
and lend at a common rate r,.  It makes no difference  whether the 
community finances a marginal project by levying taxes or by borrow- 
ing. If a tax levy is imposed, the taxpayer could sell some privately 
held municipal debt to finance the expenditure. The method of finance 
will have no effect on the net worth of the taxpayer. Also, as  the lending 
and borrowing rates are both equal to r,,  the relative price of public 
and private goods is unchanged by the existence of tax-exempt securities. 
If no constraints are imposed on municipalities  to hold taxable se- 
curities, the public sector would not undertake real investments unless 
their yield was equal to or  greater than r, the yield on taxable securities. 
But  with  restrictive  IRS rules  on their  holdings  of taxable  financial 
securities, communities will  undertake income-producing real invest- 
ments that yield  less than r  but  more than  r,.  Thus, industrial-type 
public investment will expand as the result of tax-exempt securities. 
In lower-income communities, where the representative taxpayer is 
a net borrower and does not itemize deductions under the income tax. 
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associate of the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 80  Roger H. GordodJoel Slemrod 
the private borrowing rate will be r, greater than the public borrowing 
rate r,,,. These communities will have an incentive to borrow to finance 
public  expenditures. Also, the lower cost of  public  borrowing  does 
decrease the relative cost of public expenditures. And in the absence 
of borrowing constraints, industrial-type income generating investment 
will be profitable at a yield between  r and r,.  However, the primary 
incentive will  be for low-income communities  to substitute debt for 
taxes. This  objective, constrained by  possible  debt limitations,  will 
restrict  the  expansion  of  public  consumption  and  public  income- 
generating investment. 
Exactly the same rationale applies for communities dominated by 
corporate taxpayers. Businesses deduct taxes and interest under the 
corporate tax, and a r > r, will gain from the substitution of municipal 
debt for tax finance. Also, an incentive exists for the expansion of real 
income-generating  investments  financed  by  lower-cost  municipal 
securities, 
The empirical section of the paper, based on financial information 
for municipalities  in four states, yields three basic results. First, that 
low-income communities with low marginal tax rates tend to borrow 
more relative to their incomes. This result is in accord with the theory 
developed  by  Gordon and  Slemrod  that we  have  discussed above. 
Second, there is no systematic evidence that wealthier communities 
hold relatively more taxable securities. 
This second result is not in accord with the theoretical section, where 
the authors argue that communities might engage in arbitrage by raising 
property taxes now and investing the proceeds at the before-tax rate, 
r,  and  then  lower  the taxes  in  the future. When individuals invest 
through the community, residents gain rf each year in arbitrage profits. 
So the incentive to arbitrage is predicted to increase with the tax rate 
t (the level of income), but this prediction is not supported by the facts. 
The third principal empirical finding is that the public expenditures 
per unit of income are positively related with the level of debt per unit 
of income. However, the authors calculate that an extra dollar of spend- 
ing leads a community to issue fourteen cents of extra debt. The implied 
subsidy of additional public expenditures resulting from the lower cost 
of public borrowing is quite  small, a result  consistent with  authors’ 
conclusion that the tax exemption of municipal debt has little effect on 
the level of public expenditure. 
The positive  association  between the level of public expenditures 
and the amount of debt does not negate the Gordon-Slemrod argument 
that lower-cost public debt may have a relatively  small impact on the 
size of the municipal public sector. They are quite right in arguing that 
large, mature communities can anticipate lumpy capital expenditures 
and pay for them with tax finance. But the essential result of this paper 81  An Examination of Municipal Financial Policy 
is that, given the level of  public expenditures, debt is either favored as 
a source of finance, or debt and tax finance are equivalent instruments. 
So it should not be surprising that the communities that have a relatively 
large public sector will issue relatively more debt. The empirical work 
is not  a  direct test of the proposition  that the tax-exempt  status of 
interest  on municipal  bonds has little  impact on the  size of  public 
expenditures. 
These minor  reservations notwithstanding,  this is a very  valuable 
paper that will unquestionably  stimulate further work on the relation- 
ships between tax-exempt municipal bonds and the level of local public 
expenditures. The “efficiency”  of tax exemption for local debt has 
been called into question before, but never with arguments as devas- 
tating as those developed in this paper. This Page Intentionally Left Blank